JURISDICTION TO TAX-ANOTHER WORD by MERRILL, MAURICE H.
JURISDICTION TO TAX-ANOTHER WORD
MAURICE H. MERRILLtS OME constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States merely apply familiar principles to fact situations of little
novelty or importance. Others, extending the application of those prin-
ciples to new facts, mark milestones in the progress of the law upon
familiar roads. In still others what had been dictum becomes ratio
decidendi and again the frontiers of the law expand. At other times
limitations or explanations imposed upon prior decisions serve to define
more sharply the expanded boundary. Occasionally an overruling opin-
ion marks a withdrawal from realms theretofore occupied. Into one or
another of these classes fall the common run of constitutional cases.
Upon rare occasions, however, a decision, either because it suggests the
occupation of so wide a territory by the doctrines it sets forth, or be-
cause it overturns directly or by implication so much that had been re-
garded as settled constitutional dogma, opens wide vistas of speculation
and invites examination of the possibilities that lie half-hidden therein.
To the second division of this last type of constitutional cases belong
the recent significant cases involving the problem of jurisdiction for
purposes of taxation.' So epochal seemed these cases in their effect
upon the taxing power of the states that it is not surprising they have
evoked a bountiful crop of comment.2 A fitting sense of inability to
tProfessor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. The most significant of these decisions are: Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); First National Bank
v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
2. There are two books: HARD3nG, DoUBLE TAXATIo. OF PROPERTY AND INCOME: (1933);
SOmsO, JuRsDIcrIoN AND PowER or TAXATION (1933). The more ephemeral material in
legal periodicals is voluminous. The following articles have come to my attention: Bonner,
Single Situs for Inheritance Taxation of Intangibles (1932) 16 Msm. L. REv. 335; Gal-
land, Jurisdiction for Taxation of Shares of Stock (1931) 4 RocxY MT. L. REv. 20; Gruen.
berg, The Supreme Court Limits the State Power to Tax Intangibles (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L.
Q. Rxv. 728; Harper, Jurisdiction of the States to Tax-Recent Development (1930) S
In. L. J. 507; Howard, Recent Developments and Tendencies in the Taxation of Intangi.
bles (1931) 44 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5; Lowndes, Basis of Jurisdiction in State Taxa.
tion of Inheritances and Property (1931) 29 Micn. L. REV. 850; Lowndes, Jurisdiction to
Tax Debts (1931) 19 Gao. L. J. 427; Lowndes, The Passing of Situs-Jursdctlion to Tax
Shares of Corporate Stock (1932) 45 HaRv. L. REv. 777; Lowndes, State Jurisdiction to
Tax Income (1932) 6 TEMPLE L. Q. 486; Mason, Jurisdiction for the Purposes of Inherit.
ance Taxes-Special Reference to Montana (1930) 3 Rocx" MT. L. Rav. 25; Nogsaman,
The Fourteenth Amendment in its Relation to State Taxation of Intangibles (1930) 18
CATr. L. REv. 345; Nowlin, Jurisdictional Features of State Taxation-Property and Suc-
cession Taxes (1931) 9 TEx. L. Ray. 352; Peppin, Power of the States to Tax Intangibles
or their Transfer (1930) 18 CA.M. L. Rav. 638; Rottschaefer, The Power of the States
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add anything of value to what has been said already would impel me to
silence, were it not that the prior discussion does not seem to me to lay
adequate stress upon certain factors of history and of expedience, and
that the more recent cases indicate that possibly the earlier decisions
do not have implications quite so extensive as many of us at first read-
ing thought.
The Past - More or Less Outmoded
By way of introducing our discussion, a brief r~sum6 of the constitu-
tional doctrine of jurisdiction to tax as it existed before 1930 seems
helpful. In our federal polity, combining commercial unity with govern-
mental decentralization, it was inevitable that two or more states fre-
quently should find themselves in position to exact tax tribute from the
same "economic interest" and the perpetual need for increasing funds
from which to finance the expanding activities ventured upon by our
statesmen made it equally inevitable that such opportunities should be
seized upon with avidity. The Supreme Court has taken upon itself
the task of policing this quest for revenue; and, if it does not actually
temper the wind to the shorn lamb, it does attempt to see that the shear-
ers are not too many and not wholly strangers to the range.
To accomplish this some foundation in the constitution of the United
States is necessary. Conflict of laws doctrines concerning jurisdiction
are inadequate since the injustices which it is most important to remedy
may be perpetuated effectually without essential impairment of those
principles.' In the face of positive legislation, constitutional restraints
afford the taxpayer his one secure refuge. During the nineteenth cen-
tury the Supreme Court appeared somewhat doubtful as to the exact
constitutional foundation upon which this sanctuary could be erected
and its essays in that direction were sporadic and hesitant. There seem
not more than six cases wherein state taxing power was denied,' and
a handful more wherein, although the taxes assailed were upheld, the
Court, by solemn consideration of the argument based on a jurisdic-
to Tax Intangibles (1931) 15 Mir. L. REv. 741, (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rxv. 415; Rottschaefer,
State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 H/uy. L. Rv. 1075; Rottschae-
fer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YAM.E L. J. 305.
3. Stone, J. concurring in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 215
(1930).
4. See STmox, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1-4; GOODRIr, Co.rmcr or I ows (1927) 64.
5. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1854); Northern Central
Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 7 WaIl 262 (U. S. 1863); St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall.
423 (U. S. 1870); State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872); Morgan
v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (U. S. 1872); Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1899). The
Wiggins Ferry Case has been explained as being merely an interpretation of the Ar~souri
statute rather than an exposition of constitutional limitation upon state power. Diamond
Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 91 (1903).
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tional incapacity of states to tax property beyond their borders, tacitly
agreed to the validity of the objection when supported by a proper show-
ing of fact.6 In two of these cases, dealing with the taxation of vessels
engaged in interstate trade the Court appears to find the constitutional
foundation for curtailing taxing power in a theory of burden upon inter-
state commerce by such a tax.7 In Dewey v. Des Moines,8 an action
to foreclose a tax lien upon a lot with an application for a deficiency
judgment against the nonresident owner, the refusal to permit that
judgment seems to be placed upon the doctrine in Pennoyer v. Neff' as
to jurisdiction to render personal judgments against nonresidents. In
all the other cases there is no articulate recognition of any particular
constitutional provision as the foundation of decision. There is merely
an assumption, specific or tacit, that an American state may not tax
persons or property beyond its "jurisdiction."
As the end of the century drew near, however, the ever-increasing
usefulness of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
a foundation for judicial nullification of too oppressive state action led
astute counsel to invoke it in defense of those beset by multiplied tax-
gatherers. Thrice during these closing years assertions that taxes had
been imposed without jurisdiction were given a constitutional underpin-
ning by the argument that to do so would be to deprive the taxpayer
of property without due process. The Court, by considering the tax
question upon the merits with a finding in each case that the bounds
of state jurisdiction had not been passed, tacitly agreed to this method
of investing the doctrine of jurisdictional limits with constitutional sanc-
tity.1" In 1903 it became a definite ground of decision in Louisville &
Jeffersonville Ferry Company v. Kentucky." Two years later came
Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky,12 frequently referred
to as the first case to apply the new theory. While this is inaccurate,
it remains true that this decision, by reason of its full and lucid expo-
6. The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873); Kirtland v. Hotchkis, 100
U. S. 491 (1879); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (1881); Pullman's Palace Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) ; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Rfy.
Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894); and see Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 127 U. S. 117,
121 (1888). Very likely such cases as the State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S, 575 (1875),
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 (1896), and New Orleans v. Stem-
pel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899), should also be included, although in all these cases, with the
possible exception of the last, there seems not a clearly articulate discussion of the problem
from this viewpoint.
7. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co.; Morgan v. Parham, both supra note 5.
8. 173 U. S. 193 (1899). 9. 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
10. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1897); Savings & Loan
Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898); American Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899).
11. 188 U. S. 385 (1903). 12. 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
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sition of the concept of due process as a basic requirement of taxing
jurisdiction, rightly deserves to be ranked the leading case upon the
subject. Once established, due process excluded all other constitutional
theories in this branch of the law, and so handy a tool did it prove that
the twentieth century in its first three decades has produced a multitude
of decisions developing and rounding out the doctrine, a body of learn-
ing which appeared to be seriously threatened at many points by the
line of cases starting with decisions in 1930.13
Now the due process notion in American constitutional law is one of
reasonableness, of a prohibition by the fundamental law against arbi-
trary and oppressive governmental action, to be administered by the
courts as expounders of the Constitution. The question occurs, then,
what is the test by which we may determine whether it is reasonable for
a state to exercise taxing jurisdiction? To this Union Refrigerator
Transit Company v. Kentucky 4 presents a definite answer in the bene-
fit theory of taxation. Judge Brown's language is specific.
"The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized
government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the
taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value
of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in
which he shares, such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements,
and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no
position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property
taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another state,
to which it may be said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for pro-
tection, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes
rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by
this court beyond the power of the legislature, and a taking of property with-
out due process of law."' 5
"Not only is the operation of state laws limited to persons and property
within the boundaries of the state, but property which is wholly and exclusive-
ly within the jurisdiction of another state receives none of the protection for
which the tax is supposed to be the compensation.' 0
This presents a somewhat indefinite but fairly comprehensible stand-
ard by which to test the reasonableness of the exercise of taxing power.
If the state is in a position to render some benefit to the person taxed in
13. See cases cited supra note 1. 14. 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
15. Id. at 202, citing Northern Central Ry. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 (U. S. 186S); State
Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
19 Wall. 490 (U. S. 1873); Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
19S U. S. 341 (1905).
16. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 204 (1905).
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respect of the object of taxation, the exaction is reasonable and juris-
diction exists; if the converse is true, jurisdiction, in the sense of the
due process concept of reasonableness, is absent. Recognition, of course,
is accorded to the practical necessities of revenue gathering. Lack of
children is no answer to the demand for a school tax; want of a vehi-
cle will not excuse contribution to the road fund.17 The benefit theory
of jurisdiction is not to be pressed to the point of requiring a quid pro
quo for each payment. It is enough that the state be in a position to
render the service. It is not requisite that the taxpayer make use of it.
Around this fundamental conception the cases prior to 1930 can be ar-
ranged in a consistent fashion. A summary of the application that has
been made of the principle in these cases will aid us in understanding
the system which the recent decisions appeared to overthrow.
In the case of real estate, clearly the jurisdiction where the land lies
is in a position to render protection and benefit. Taxation by it will be
consistent with due process.'" Taxation by any other state will deny
due process.'
Tangible personalty follows much the same rule. The state where it
is permanently located may tax it, since it is given protection. 0 A state
in which it is not found, though the domicil of the owner, may not tax.21
It affords the owner no protection nor benefit with respect to this par-
ticular property. Unlike land, however, personalty may go a-traveling
and may be found in more than one state during the taxable year. Some
of it, such as that employed in interstate commerce, is constantly shift-
ing and passing from state to state. From each state through which it
travels it receives the boon of protection and of government. Reason
would appear to suggest that each state wherein the property remains
17. Id. at 203. See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63,,76 (1911).
18. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898); Paddell v.
City of New York, 211 U. S. 446 (1908); Central Railroad Company of New Jersey
v. Jersey City, 209 U. S. 473 (1908).
19. Attempts to tax lands beyond the border seem not to have been made, At least
they have not found their way into the reports. The only cases which can be cited for
this principle, therefore, involve incorporeal hereditaments which are regarded as so closely
associated with land as to be governed by the same ruling. Louisville and Jeffersonvillo
Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1903) (ferry franchise); North Side Canal Co. v.
State Board of Equalization, 17 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), cert. denied, 274 U. S.
740 (1927) (water rights appurtenant to land).
20. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592 (1899); Carstairs v. Coch-
ran, 193 U. S. 10 (1904); Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905);
Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U. S. 340 (1908); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.
S. 285 (1910); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U. S. 503 (1929).
21. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rr. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341 (1905); Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Selliger v. Kentucky, 213
U. S. 200 (1909); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919); Wallace v.
Hines, 253 U. S. 66 (1920).
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for a substantial period be allowed to require a contribution to the sup-
port of its government. 2 In the case of railroad cars this has been the
Supreme Court's attitude. States other than the owner's domicil are per-
mitted to tax upon a basis reflecting the fair average value of the property
within their borders. Where the owner was domiciled within the state,
permission was extended to tax all the cars found there during the year-
at least if not so continuously in any other state as to be taxable there. -
The basis for a distinction either upon the domicil of the owner or upon
the gaining of taxable situs elsewhere is not apparent on the benefit
theory of reasonableness. If specific cars are within the state long
enough to be accorded substantial protection, it would seem logically
consistent with the benefit theory to permit taxation of all of them,
regardless of the owner's residence or of the average amount within the
borders; and if the state does furnish substantial protection surely it
should be able to exact the tax which is deemed to be an equivalent
therefor regardless of whether other states may also be in a position to
claim a similar privilege. In a recent decision, however, the Court has
ruled definitely that taxation must be limited to "the number of cars
which on the average were found to be physically present within the
state."'2
Strangely enough, ships voyaging from state to state, though upon a
fixed route and observing regularity of schedule, have not been treated
in the same manner as rolling stock. The Court has refused to regard
regular visits as sufficiently conferring jurisdiction, despite the obvious
furnishing of police and other protection during their stay. -" Instead
it has leaned toward a theory of taxation by the state of the home port, -r
or, if no home port is apparent, then by the state of the owner's domicil
though the ship has never been there and mayhap never can reach it.
22. See Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 127 U. S. 117, 121 (18S8); cf. Pickard v.
Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34, 46 (1886).
23. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); American Refriger-
ator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch,
177 U. S. 149 (1900).
24. New York Central Ry. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906).
25. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933).
26. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1854); St. Louis v. Wig-
gins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U. S. 1870); Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (U. S. 1872);
Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1906). In the latter case, prezence in
the state in the course of receiving cargo, buying stores, employing seamen, and for other
purposes, was held to be insufficient. It is rather difficult to see why as much service
is not rendered by a state to a vessel under such circumstances as to a railroad car travers-
ing lines within its borders.
27. See Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., at 599; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co,
at 431; Morgan v. Parham, at 476, 478, all svpra note 10.
28. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
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In these ship cases the benefit theory of jurisdiction to tax seems not to
receive logical application.
This one exception, however, serves merely to emphasize the rule.
Elsewhere it has been given full sway. In addition to the examples
already given we may cite the cases involving property transferred per-
manently from one state to another during the taxing year. There the
new abode is permitted to impose its levy' with no apparent anxiety
on the part of the Court as to whether or not anything has been exacted
by the domain of origin.3" So also, in United States v. Bennett, 1 we
find the capacity of the federal government to render service to its citi-
zens abroad employed to buttress the argument for a taxing power in
that government which will extend, unlike that of the states, to property
situated beyond its territorial limits.
Tangible property, however, after all is said remains of a compara-
tively stable and stay-at-home nature. Ordinarily but one state is likely
to be in position to afford it protection or other service and thereby to
acquire dominion for purposes of taxation. Railroad cars, steamships,
and motor trucks, with all their errant proclivities, form so small a por-
tion of the great mass of tangibles as hardly to present an appreciable
number of exceptions to the rule of one thing, one tax. It is in relation
to intangible property that the benefit theory of due process has been
most fruitful in multiplying taxes. Here the facile maxim, mobilia
sequuntur personam, has retained the vitality which was shorn from it
by decisions attacking jurisdiction to tax tangibles to their physical lo-
cation. For this the benefit theory has a plausible reason. A chose in
action has no true location of its own. A mere advantage which the
law will protect, nay enforce, for its owner, it can have no real exist-
ence, in legal theory at least, apart from him. The state of his domicil,
protecting him in the exercise of his faculties, in the enjoyment of his
wealth, in the acquisition, assertion, and exploitation of these intangi-
ble rights, confers benefit upon him in respect to them and so may rea-
29. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.
S. 211 (1908); and Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (1913), may be cited as examples.
Griggsby Construction Co. v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 32 So. 399 (1902), puts the argument
persuasively from a state court's standpoint.
30. The theory of protection received from a successive number of governmental units
as involving a correlative power to tax is thus expressed by McKenna, J. in Diamond
Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 90 (1903): "Nor is that power impugned by the
principle that protection is the consideration of taxation. There is protection during the
transit through the municipalities of the state and at its termination in the state--protec-
tion accommodated to the kind of property, and as efficient as links are to the continuity
of a chain."
31. 232 U. S. 299 (1914).
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sonably assert its claim to tax them.3 2 The Supreme Court has upheld
this view without exception or qualification. 3
Other states, however, may well claim that they also furnish benefit
in respect to this sort of property. It has been argued with much pro-
priety that in the case of debts the state of the debtor's domicil should
have jurisdiction to tax, because its law gives life to the obligation and
its judicial machinery must be invoked to enforce it.,4 But in the only
two cases where jurisdiction has been asserted upon the sole basis of the
debtor's residence the Supreme Court has denied the assertion. While
the second of these cases"s has been explained by the Court as involving
an impairment of the obligation of contract,3 7 this does not seem so
apparent from the report, which indicates that the tax may have been
authorized, although not at the exact rate later imposed, before the
issuance of the obligations which were taxed.3" If this is so, it seems
arguable that the decision is based upon jurisdiction rather than upon
obligation of contract, and it is in that light that it is treated by Mr. Jus-
tice McReynolds in Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota.
32. "The creditor, it is conceded, is a permanent resident within the jurisdiction of the
state imposing the tax. The debt is property in his hands constituting a portion of his
wealth, from which he is under the highest obligation, in common with his fellow citizens
of the same state, to contribute for the support of the government whose protection he
enjoys." Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 498 (1879). See also Dyer v. Ozzborne,
11 R. I. 321, 327 (1876).
33. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 498 (1879) (bonded debt, secured by mort-
gage on land in another state); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (1831) (regis
tered public debt of another state); Sturgis v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511 (1835) (shares of
stock in foreign corporation); Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730 (1903) (same); Wright v.
Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co., 195 U. S. 219 (1904) (same); Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.
S. 390 (1912) (same); Hawley v. City of Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (1914) (same); Fidelity &
Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917) (deposits in bank in another state);
Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325 (1920) (taxation by s.tate
of corporation's domicil of its intangible property interest, though arising out of business
done in other states); Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921) (taxation by Ohio
of seat owned by Ohioan in New York stock exchange); Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U. S.
88 (1923) (tax on intangible value of domestic corporation engaged in interstate and for-
eign commerce). Analogous is Ewa Plantation Co. v. Wilder, 289 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923), holding that income from corporate bonds and notes and deposits of money, owned
by a Hawaiian corporation but held by its agent in California, was taxable by Hawaii
under the rule of mobilia sequuntur personam.
34. See Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Gar-
nishment and Taxation (1918) 31 HARv. L. RExv. 905, 922.
35. Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 (U. S. 1868); State Tax on For-
eign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872).
36. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, supra note 35.
37. See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 13 (1928).
38. See State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, supra note 35, at 301, 302.
39. 280 U. S. 204, 212 (1930); see also Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board
of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 355 (1911).
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At any rate, the first decision seems applicable and no case appears to the
contrary. If, on the other hand, the creditor is constantly reinvesting
his capital within the state, as by collecting the notes falling due
through a local agent and again lending the proceeds; if, in fine, it be-
comes part of a business definitely assignable to and carried on in that
particular commonwealth, whether in the manner specified or in some
other way, the Court looks with a liberal eye upon the extension of the
taxing power over the business thus carried on. In terms of benefit this is
easy to explain. Obviously various special forms of protection are accord-
ed the business in its home for which it is only fair that the owner should
pay" By way of analogy to the doctrine applicable to tangibles, it is
said that the capital has acquired a "business situs" in the state where
the business is transacted." This theory has been applied to permit
the taxation of credits arising from a money-lending business, whether
evidenced by notes' or not,43 of bonds deposited with a state official
by a foreign insurance company for the protection of local policy-hold-
40. "Persons are not permitted to avail themselves for their own benefit of the laws
of a State in the conduct of business within its limits, and then to escape their duo con-
tribution to the public needs. . . . " Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 144
(1900). "The insurance company chose to enter into the business of lending money within
the state of Louisiana, and employed a local agent to conduct that busines.... Under
such circumstances they have a taxable situs in the state of their origin." Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 402, 403 (1907). "The legal fiction ex-
pressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, yields to the fact of actual control
elsewhere. And in the case of credits, though intangible, arising as did those in the pros-
ent instance, the control adequate to confer jurisdiction may be found in the sovereignty
of the debtor's domicile. The debt, of course, is not property in the hands of the debtor;
but it is an obligation of the debtor, and is of value to the creditor because he may be
compelled to pay; and power over the debtor at his domicil is control of the ordinary
means of enforcement. . . .The credits would have no existence save for the permils3lon
of Louisiana; they issued from the business transacted under her sanction within her bor-
ders; the sums were payable by persons domiciled within the state, and there the rights
of the creditor were to be enforced. If locality, in the sense of subjection to sovereign
power, could be attributed to these credits, they could be localized there. If, as property,
they could be deemed to be taxable at all, they could be taxed there." Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 354 (1911).
41. See HARDING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 76.
42. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899); Bristol v. Washington County, 177
U. S. 133 (1900); State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National D'Escompte, 191 U. S.
388 (1903); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1907). In
the first of these cases it was suggested that jurisdiction rested on the fact that notes were
tangible in nature and could be regarded as property within the jurisdiction. But the
later cases put it upon the ground elaborated in the text. Cf. DeGanay v. Lederer, 250
U. S. 376 (1919) (Federal income tax on securities owned by French citizen, domiciled in
France).
43. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346 (1911);
Orient Insurance Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 358 (1911).
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ers," of seats in a grain exchange," of intangible values, over and above
the physical property within the state, arising from the operation therein
of part of a unitary business.40  The mere location of the tangible evi-
dence of intangible property within the state, however, has not been
regarded as involving sufficient service to justify taxation,4 7 a conclusion
somewhat difficult to justify under the orthodox theory in view of the
police protection furnished.48  The service afforded by the state of in-
corporation in giving life to and assuring the continued existence of its
corporate creations has been regarded, and rightly, as justifying a tax
upon the shares of nonresident stockholders.40 In the case of property
held in trust the residence of the legal owner rather than that of the
beneficial owner has been looked to in the application of the doctrine
of taxation by the owner's domicil.10 That a debt owed to a nonresident
is secured by tangible property lying within the state has been held to
justify a taxas but the statute was one by which the mortgage debt was
deducted from the assessment of the property to the owner and so may
properly be upheld as an apportioned tax upon tangible property0 -
The decisions relating to inheritance taxes followed along much the
same lines. There seems to have been substantial agreement in the
proposition that land should be so taxed where situated. At least the
44. Scottish Union and National Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611 (1905).
45. Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184 (1916).
46. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1897), rehearing denied,
166 U. S. 185 (1897); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus,
154 U. S. 439 (1894); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri, 190 U. S. 412 (1903); United
States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912); St. Louis & Eastern St. Louis
Electric Ry. Co. v. Missouri, 256 U. S. 314 (1921); Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137
(1923). Possibly earlier manifestations of this rule are State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.
575 (1875); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 (1896).
47. Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392 (1907); Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200 (1909).
48. Dicta have suggested the propriety of taxing bonds where kept "because by a
notion going back to very early law the obligation is, or originally was, inseparable from
the paper or parchment which expressed it." Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200, 204
(1909). See also Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 406 (1907). But they seem never to
have ripened into decision in the Supreme Court. In a modern day there would seem
to be equally as strong reasons for basing power to tax on the presence of any tangible
evidence of intangible property.
49. Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (1905). Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19
Wall. 490 (U. S. 1873), is sometimes incorrectly cited for this doctrine. The protesting
stockholders in that case were residents of the state and their contention was merely that
the state should tax them at their domicil, and not at that of the bank.
50. Taxation by state of trustees domicdl: Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. 355 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1888); and notice Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255 (1903); No taxation by state of
cestuis domicil: Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27 (1928); Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929).
51. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898).
52. See Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rrv. 537, 596.
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Supreme Court appears not to have been faced with the proposition at
all. Mobilia sequuntur personam in respect to tangible property sur-
vived much longer in inheritance levies than in property taxation. The
conflict of laws rule that the law of the owner's domicil determines the
succession to personalty wherever located5 3 made it possible to argue
very convincingly that the state of domicil, by providing a rule of
intestate succession or a statute of wills, afforded a substantial service
in the transmission even of tangible personalty located outside its borders
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the benefit theory of taxing
jurisdiction. 4 It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court, in Frick
v. Pennsylvania 5 overthrew this view, pointing out that if the state
wherein the property is situated does apply the rule of the domicil in
matters of succession it does so only by virtue of its own common law
rule to that effect. In essence, therefore, it is the law of the state of
situs that governs. 6 By this reasoning the rule as to inheritance taxes
upon tangible property becomes the same as the rule for property taxes.
The state where the property is located may tax; others may not.
jurisdiction to levy inheritance taxes upon intangibles likewise tended
to follow the rules applying to property taxes. The state of the cred-
itor's domicil might tax-mobilia sequuntur personam.5 So might the
state of business situs.5s So might the state of incorporation with re-
spect to the transfer of corporate stock. 9 But application of the benefit
theory permitted taxation of inheritance by states which could not have
sent their publicans against the property itself. The necessity of going
to the state of the debtor's domicil to collect the claim for the estate
was regarded as putting that state in a position to demand its tribute
money.60 A similar effect was given to the location of tangible evidences
of the debt in a third state, resulting in ancillary proceedings to make
them available.6 The state of residence of the beneficiary of a trust
who retained control over the distribution of income and a right of revo-
cation might tax the transfer.2 Even in this field there were limits,
53. See GOoDRIcH, CoNIICr Or LAWS (1927) §§ 158, 161.
54. See Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 631 (1916).
55. 268 U. S. 473 (1925). 56. Id. at 491-493.
57. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1
(1928); see Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 574 (1926)"
58. Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U. S. 115 (1918).
59. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268
U. S. 473 (1925).
60. "But it is plain that the transfer does depend upon the law of New York, not be-
cause of any theoretical speculation concerning the whereabouts of the debt, but because
of the practical effect of its power over the debtor. . . . What gives the debt validity?
Nothing but the fact that the law of the place where the debtor is will make him pay."
Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205 (1903).
61. Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434 (1914).
62. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916).
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however. The residence of the donee of a power under the will of a
nonresident testator was regarded as furnishing no jurisdictional assist-
ance in the exercise of that power,s while the separate corporate per-
sonality produced a similar result in the case of attempted taxation of
the transfer of the shares of a nonresident stockholder by the state
wherein the corporate property was located."
Taxes upon the person, on the benefit theory, could, of course, be
imposed by the state of domicil. 5 But if one spends a considerable
portion of the time in another jurisdiction, deriving therefrom protection
of life and possessions, and particularly if a gainful occupation is there
carried on, it would seem that the denarius could there be demanded
also. Haavik v. Alaska Packers AssociatioCO apparently sustains this
view. On the other hand where one is neither domiciled nor a substan-
tial sojourner the benefit foundation for the taxing power is dearly
absent.67
Income is so closely associated, at least in enjoyment, with the per-
son receiving it that one assumes almost unconsciously that the state
of the recipient's domicil, since it protects him in his enjoyment, may
tax it. It has been so held, even though the income be derived from
business carried on elsewheres or from trust funds owned by a non-
resident trustee.G9 On the other hand, the state where the business
is carried on, or where the property is located, from which the income
is derived with equal logic may assert the rendition of services justify-
ing the imposition of an income tax. Repeatedly the Supreme Court
has recognized the validity of such levies.70  The wider sphere of serv-
63. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567 (1926).
64. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926).
65. The point appears to have been taken as obvious. The validity of a poll tax or
other tax upon the person seems never to have been contested in the Supreme Court. Cf.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, SS (1917); "The present tax is
a tax upon the person, . . .and is imposed, it may be presumed, for the general ad,an-
tages of living within the jurisdiction."
66. 263 U. S. 510 (1924).
67. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1899); and see Haavik v. Abd.a Packers
Ass'n, 263 U. S. 510, 513 (1924).
68. Ewa Plantation Co. v. Wilder, 289 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Lawrence v.
State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
69. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 17 (1920). "The beneficiary is domiciled in
Massachusetts, has the protection of her laws, and there receives and holds the income
from the trust property. We find nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment which prevents
the taxation in Massachusetts of an interest of this character, thus owned and enjoyed by a
resident of the State."
70. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mlfg. Co., 252 U.
S. 60 (1920); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Atlantic
Coast Line Rr. Co. v. Doughton, 262 U. S. 413 (1923); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v.
State Tax Commison, 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
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ice, internationally viewed, rendered by the federal government, permits
it to tax, consistently with due process under the Fifth Amendment,
incomes earned abroad by its citizens of foreign domicil. 1
Poll taxes furnish the strongest case for imposition by the domiciliary
state. It is but natural that we find no case challenging such a levy."
Yet one may remain a substantial period in a state other than his domi-
cil deriving therefrom important governmental benefits. Upon the basis
of reasonableness heretofore prevailing, the state should have an equal-
ly valid claim to exact a poll tax; and such, it appears to me, is the
effect of the decision in Haavik v. Alaska Packers Association.7" Whether
the residence be for gain, as in that case, or for pleasure would seem to
be immaterial. The important thing is that it be residence, though of
a non-domiciliary character, as distinguished from a mere transitory
presence. 4 On the other hand clearly no tax based upon the person
may be levied where complete absence from the territorial limits makes
the rendition of personal benefit an impossibility."
Excise taxation presents a fairly consistent application of the benefit
theory. The state where the act is performed may tax.70 A state where-
in no part of the action takes place may not, though it be the domicil of
the actor.77
Such is the picture whose outlines are formed by the decisions prior
to 1930. In it the one dominant concept is that jurisdiction to tax is
dependent upon the rbasonableness of the claim to exercise that juris-
diction and that reasonableness in turn is dependent upon potentiality
of benefit. The problem is viewed from the standpoint of the states.
If a state is in position to render some benefit in respect to the object
of taxation surely it is reasonable to demand a contribution to the sup-
port of its government. With such a concept of reasonableness it should,
of course, be immaterial that some other state, also a purveyor of serv-
ice, may be equally justified in a similar demand. Both may properly
71. Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
72. Possibly The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873), sustaining a tax
imposed on a domestic corporation based on the cash value of the shares, presents such
an attack. The case seems more properly classified with those under note 76 inlra.
73. 263 U. S. 510 (1924).
74. See Haavik v. Alaska Packers Ass'n., 263 U. S. 510, 514 (1924).
75. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1899).
76. The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873) (exercise of corporate privi-
lege) ; Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 (1907) (transfer of stock); Keeney v. New York,
222 U. S. 525 (1912) (transfer of property); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Penn-
sylvania, 238 U. S. 143 (1915) (performance of contract); Kansas City, Ft. Scott &
Memphis Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227 (1916) (exercise of corporate privilege); Kansas
City, Memphis & Birmingham Rr. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 11 (1916) (same),.
77. Provident Savings Life Assurance Soc. v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103 (1915); St.
Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S. 346 (1922).
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claim taxing jurisdiction. The claim of neither rightfully may be denied.
Repeated utterances of the Court, borne into practice by decision, sup-
port this assertion that double taxation, in the sense of the taxation of
the same object by more than one state, encountered no barriers what-
ever in the judicial exposition of due process of law.7 A survey of the
course of decision reviewed in the preceding pages will reveal numerous
examples.7 9
The Recent Decisions
First in point of time of the recent series of unsettling decisions was
Farmers Loan & Trust Company v. Minnesota. ° A New York deced-
ent left behind him negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness
issued by the state of Minnesota and by the municipalities of St. Paul
and Minneapolis. The transfer was taxed in New York. Minnesota
likewise imposed a tax which, after some hesitation, was upheld by the
state supreme court.8 ' Thereupon the executor under the will took
the case to the Supreme Court of the United States. From that tribunal
it secured a decision denying, upon Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
Minnesota's jurisdiction to tax.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the majority, recognized that
Blackstone v. Miller12 stood squarely in the way of the result reached.
As he said, that case "and certain approving opinions, lend support to
the doctrine that ordinarily choses in action are subject to taxation both
at the debtor's domicile and at the domicile of the creditor; that two
7S. "The real grievance . . . . is that, more than probably, they are taxed elsewhere.
But with that the state of Alabama is not concerned. No doubt it would be a great ad-
vantage to the country and to the individual states if principles of taxation could ba
agreed upon which did not conflict with each other, and a common scheme could be adopt-
ed by which taxation of substantially the same property in two jurisdictions could bZ
avoided. But the Constitution of the United States does not go so far.' Kidd v. Alabama,
188 U. S. 730, 732 (1903). "No doubt this power on the part of two states to tax on
different and more or less inconsistent principles, leads to some hardship ..... But thes2
inconsistencies infringe no rule of constitutional law." Blackstone v. Miller, 183 U. S. gS9,
204 (1903). But liability to taxation in one state does not necessarily exclude liability in
another. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 5S (1917).
"Exemption from double taxation by one and the same state is not guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment ...much less is taxation by two states upon identical or closely
related property interests falling within the jurisdiction of both forbidden?' Citizens Nat.
Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, 109 (1921). "To this it is sufficient to say that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit double taxation." Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand
Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 330 (1920).
79. Cf. the list given by Stone, J. concurring in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minne-
sota, 280 U. S. 204, 215 (1930).
80. 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
81. In re Estate of Taylor, 175 linn. 310, 219 N. W. 153 (1928), affd 176 Minn. 634,
222 N. W. 528 (1928).
82. 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
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states may tax on different and more or less inconsistent principles the
same testamentary transfer of such property without conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment."813  But, he argued, the result of that view is
bad; its "inevitable tendency" is "to disturb good relations among the
states and produce the kind of discontent expected to subside after
establishment of the Union."'  "Primitive conditions have passed;
business is now transacted on a national scale. A very large part of
the country's wealth is invested in negotiable securities whose protection
against discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation, is matter of the
greatest moment."85  Many states, "perhaps two-thirds . . . have en-
deavored to avoid the evil by resort to reciprocal exemption laws."80
"In this court the presently approved doctrine is that no state may tax
anything not within her jurisdiction without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' '8 7 "Tangibles with permanent situs therein, and their
testamentary transfer, may be taxed only by the state where they are
found. ' 8  "We have determined that in general intangibles may be
properly taxed at the domicile of their owner and we can find no suffi-
cient reason for saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity
against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to
tangibles.18 1 "Blackstone v. Miller no longer can be regarded as a cor-
rect exposition of existing law; and to prevent misunderstanding it is
definitely overruled."9 By way of imposing further emphasis upon the
"one thing, one tax" dogma thus expounded we are reminded "that the
right of one state to tax may depend somewhat upon the power of an-
other so to do."'" Moreover, while the business situs cases are too
numerous to be overruled as summarily as Blackstone v. Miller, "The
present record gives no occasion for us to inquire whether such securi-
ties can be taxed a second time at the owner's domicile."0 2
Concurring, Mr. Justice Stone sounds a warning against the broad doc-
trine that multiple taxation by different states is within the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, pointing out that there are "many situa-
tions in which a single economic interest may have such legal relation-
ships with different taxing jurisdictions as to justify its taxation in
both. . . . ,,3 He would reach the result of the case on the orthodox
theory, urging that, since "the transfer was effected in New York by
one domiciled there and is controlled by its law," the power of Minne-
sota, circumscribed by the obligation of contract clause, to affect the dis-
position of securities not even kept within its boundaries, is too puerile
83. 280 U. S. 204, 209 (1930). 84. Ibid.
85. Id. at 211. 86. Id. at 209.
87. Id. at 210. 88. Id. at 211.
89. Id. at 212. 90. Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 211. 92. Id. at 213.
93. Id. at 215.
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to afford any basis for a claim that the Gopher State, potentially or ac-
tually, plays any beneficial part in the transfer.54 Mr. Justice Holmes
and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented.
It was possible for Mr. Justice Stone to reconcile the result of Farm-
ers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota with the benefit theory of
jurisdiction, and the writer is inclined to agree with that reconciliation.
In Baldwin v. Missouri9 5 however, the benefit theory and the single
jurisdiction theory came into irreconcilable conflict and Mr. Justice
Stone joined the ranks of the dissenters. An Illinois decedent left de-
posits in a Missouri bank and coupon bonds and promissory notes kept
in that state. "Most of these notes were executed by citizens of Mis-
souri, and the larger part were secured by liens upon lands lying there-
in."96 Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in Missouri
to assist the transfer. Blackstone v. Miller would have supported a tax
on the transfer of the deposits without the ancillary proceedings and
Wheeler v. Sohmer8 would have justified it so far as applied to those
choses in action represented by tangible evidence located in Missouri
particularly in view of the resort to ancillary administration. Six judges,
for whom Mr. Justice McReynolds spoke, held the Missouri exaction
invalid. Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissented in opinions writ-
ten by the first and the third. 9
The thesis of the majority is short and easily stated. The debts rep-
resented by the securities in question were intangible property whose
transfer was taxable at the owner's domicile. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids any other state to tax. Reserved for consideration, how-
ever, is the question whether a state might tax "either the interest which
a mortgagee as such may have in lands lying therein, or the transfer
of that interest.""0  Relying upon the doctrines propounded in Farm-
ers Loan & Trust Company v. Minnesota,0' this decision applied
them logically and in a manner definitely inconsistent with the benefit
theory of jurisdiction.
Other cases followed. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission 1 2
added little to the picture. It held merely that a debt arising from
money lent on open account to a corporation by its majority stockhold-
er, a nonresident of the state where the corporation was organized and
94. Id. at 214. 95. 281 U. S. 586 (1930).
96. Id. at 589. 97. 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
98. 233 U. S. 434 (1914).
99. Mr. Justice Holmes expresses the doleful view that the court has made the sT-y
the limit of its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, while Ar. Justice Stone's opin-
ion is devoted to pointing out the inconsistency between the decision in the ca-e and the
anciently received doctrine.
100. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 594 (1930).
101. 280 U. S. 204 (1930). 102. 282 U. S. 1 (1930).
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transacted its business, did not have a business situs in that state so as
to support a tax on its transfer at the stockholder's death.
First National Bank v. Maine,03 however, brought the new theory of
the unreasonableness of multi-state taxation to the forefront again. It
denied the power of the state of incorporation to tax the transfer of
stock owned by a nonresident decedent, impliedly approved in Frick v.
Pennsylvania.'0 The Court divided in the accustomed manner, and the
debate between the two parties was about as acrimonious as is consist-
ent with judicial etiquette. The majority opinion insisted that "Due
regard for the processes of correct thinking compels the conclusion that
a determination fixing the local situs of a thing for the purpose of trans-
ferring it in one state carries with it an implicit denial that there is a
local situs in another state for the purpose of transferring the same
thing there."' 5 The minority defended their intellectual competence
by responding that "Only by a recourse to a form of words-saying that
there is no taxable subject within the state, by reason of the fictitious
attribution to the intangible interest of the stockholder of a location
elsewhere,-is it possible to stigmatize the tax as arbitrary." 00  The
distinction between the tests of due process employed is obvious. The
prevailing opinion rests squarely upon a "rule of immunity from taxa-
tion by more than one state .... "'o' The dissenters insist that "con-
trol and benefit are together the ultimate and indubitable justification
of all taxation."'08
The implication to be drawn from these decisions was self-evident.
While the cases themselves involved inheritance taxation only, the prin-
ciples enunciated by the majority were not so limited. The analogy
drawn to property tax cases, the insistence upon the iniquity of multi-
state imposts, the generality with which the doctrine of "immunity
against taxation at more than one place . . . "o0 was proclaimed, the
solemn statement that "The rule of immunity from taxation by more
than one state, deducible from the decisions in respect of these various
and distinct kinds of property, is broader than the applications thus far
made of it,""' all evidenced a new conception of due process in which
reasonableness was to be determined, not from the standpoint of the
states from whose protection the economic interest taxed derived some
benefit, but from the viewpoint of the taxpayer protesting against con-
tributing so much of his substance to so many different claimants. The
almost unanimous opinion of legal scholars so interpreted it. Today
the position of the Court seems not so certain.
103. 284 U. S. 312 (1932). 104. 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
105. 284 U. S. 312, 326 (1932). 106. Id. at 333.
107. Id. at 326. 108. Id. at 334.
109. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 212 (1930).
110. First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 326 (1932).
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Lawrence v. State Tax Commissionm upset the apple cart. That case
permitted Mississippi to tax a resident upon his income derived from
business carried on in Tennessee. By cases so many in number, so re-
cent in time, and so reasonable in result as to preclude any notion that
the Court intended to overrule them, it is settled that Tennessee also
might have levied contribution upon this revenue.112 The decision upon
this point was unanimous. Indubitably, the Supreme Court does not
intend to apply in every field the rule that due process forbids multi-
state taxation. It refused to apply it in this case.113  Moreover, 'Mr.
Justice Stone, who writes for this unanimous court, cites the decisions
upholding property taxes by more than one state as living cases, say-
ing that such double taxation "has been uniformly upheld."114 Like-
wise, in his reasoning sustaining the tax he returns the Court, for whom
he speaks officially, to benefit as the test of jurisdiction.11
So far as the present controversy is concerned, the remaining cases
decided since 1930 are rather unimportant. Klein v. Board of Tax
Supervisors""' upheld a property tax levied by Kentucky upon shares
held by a resident in a New Jersey corporation. This is consistent with
either continued adherence to the benefit test or an extension of the rule
of the inheritance tax decisions to property taxation. The point was
not discussed as the case was fought along other lines. In Hans Rees'
Sons v. North Carolina" a North Carolina tax on the income of a New
111. 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
112. See cases cited supra note 70, and in addition note Hans Rees' Sons v. North Caro-
lina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931), in which the power of the state to tax income from business
done in the state was conceded and the dispute was simply whether the taxing formula
allotted too large a share to the state.
113. Of course those who approve the use of due process to prevent multi-state taxa-
tion think the Lawrence case is wrong. See HAnDING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218-227.
114. 286 U. S. 276, 280 (1932).
115. "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant
right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable from the responsibility for sshar-
ing the costs of government.' Id. at 279. "It is enough, so far as the constitutional power
of the state to levy is concerned, that the tax is imposed by M'isisippi on its own citizens
with reference to the receipt and enjoyment of income derived from the conduct of busi-
ness, regardless of the place where it is carried on. The tax, which is apportioned to the
ability of the taxpayer to bear it, is founded upon the protection afforded to the recipi-
ent of the income by the state, in his person, in his right to receive the income, and in
his enjoyment of it when received. These are rights and privileges incident to his domicile
in the state and to them the economic interest realized by the receipt of income or rep-
resented by the power to control it, bears a direct legal relationship .... We can find no
basis for holding that taxation of the income at the domicile of the recipient is either
within the purview of the rule now established that tangibles located outside the state of
the owner are not subject to taxation within it, or is in any respect so arbitrary or un-
reasonable as to place it outside the constitutional power of taxation reserved to the state.'
Id. at 280.
116. 282 U. S. 19 (1930). 117. 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
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York corporation doing business in the Tarheel State was invalidated,
because the formula employed to determine the North Carolina income
allocated too large a share of the total revenue to that state. In its tacit
recognition of the propriety of a North Carolina tax upon income aris-
ing from business and property within her boundaries the case adds to
the significance of the decision in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission118
as a repudiation of the notion that due process precludes taxation of the
same income by more than one state. In Graniteville Manufacturing
Company v. Query,"9 the court upheld the levy by South Carolina of
an excise tax upon the signing of notes within the state, although the
notes did not become effective as obligations until the payee outside
the state approved the loan which they were to evidence and credited
the proceeds to the maker's account. Burnet v. Brooks'2 0 undertakes to
dissociate the restriction of Federal taxing power under the Fifth
Amendment due process provision from the limitation developed
from similar language in the Fourteenth Amendment as applied
to the states. In so doing, it departs from the traditional benefit
test, laying emphasis instead upon power over the subject of taxation.
The result, however, is in no sense inconsistent with the benefit
theory in its widest sense. Johnson Oil Refining Company v. Okla-
homa12' restricts taxation of railway cars by a state other than that
of the owner's domicil to the average number present during
the taxable period as against the claim to tax on the basis of the full
value of each car in the state for any portion of the tax year. This
fully accords with the application of the benefit theory in prior deci-
sions. Some of the language employed indicated that a similar restric-
tion might be imposed on the domiciliary state if the cars are constantly
"on the go.111 2 2 This is entirely consistent with the benefit principle;
it likewise tends to reduce multi-state taxation.
Watchman, What of the Night?
To the lawyer, whether teacher or practitioner, the present state of
the authorities upon the subject of jurisdiction to tax seems properly
describable as one of encircling gloom. Such lights as glimmer upon
118. 286 U. S. 276 (1932). 119. 283 U. S. 376 (1931).
120. 288 U. S. 378 (1933) (upholding Federal estate tax upon securities held In New
York and a bank deposit in that state, the property of a decedent who was a British sub-
ject resident in Cuba). As to a state tax on the transfer of shares of stock owned by a
nonresident alien decedent in a corporation chartered under its laws, see In re McCrecry's
Estate, 220 Calif. 26, 29 P. (2d) 186 (1934), and Comment thereto in (1934) 23 CAMw,
L. Rxv. 93.
121. 290 U. S. 158 (1933).
122. "When a fleet of cars is habitually employed in several states-the individual cars
constantly running in and out of each state-it cannot be said that any one of the states
is entitled to tax the entire number of cars regardless of their use in the other states." 290
U. S. 158, 162 (1933).
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the pathway of future decisions are fitful and of little aid. The fire
and brimstone so recently poured by the majority opinions in the Min-
nesota, the Missouri and the Maine cases upon the benefit theory still
retain their baleful glare and definitely assure us that inheritance taxa-
tion will not be permitted to travel that road. The Lawrence case may
be likened to a small bonfire lighting up a narrow area, that of income
taxation. In that field, very obviously, the Court does not consider
odious the possibility of multi-state taxation. With respect to all other
forms of taxation, the safest answer to the question whether the ancient
landmarks or the new trail will be followed appears to be, "I do not
know." The profession doubtless will welcome the dawn of garish day,
illumined by the light of the many decisions which will be necessary to
dispel the present uncertainty. Meanwhile, writers, boldly invading do-
mains shunned even by archangels, may be permitted the luxury of sug-
gesting what seems the preferable course.
Conceivably, the inheritance tax cases might be abandoned in favor
of a whole-hearted return to the former rule. This seems neither likely
nor desirable. The late decisions are aimed at certain grave conditions
which flourished under the application of the benefit theory of jurisdic-
tion to tax inheritances. The nation and many of the states are com-
mitted to policies of progressive taxation in this field, with rather high
rates in the upper brackets. If two, or three, or four states be permitted
to tax the same estate, or parts of it, the possibility of almost complete
confiscation where very large amounts are involved becomes more than
a chimera of the imagination. Of even moderate estates major fractions
might be exacted. Indubitably there is much to be said for the policy
of restricting or even abolishing the privilege of transmitting property
at death. But even our most leftwardly advanced systems of taxation
do not purport to adopt the latter policy, and it is perhaps inconsistent
with the position of the states in the Union to permit it to arise in prac-
tice by cumulating the exactions of several jurisdictions. Viewed in this
light, the inheritance tax cases may bear some remote relationship to
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions."' The end sought by these
decisions therefore seems a desirable one. Our doubts, like those of
the dissenting judges, have been directed to the propriety of the means;
particularly with respect to the far-flung application of the new doc-
trine suggested by the unrestraint of the language in which it was
couched. Now that the result has been reached, retraction, with its
unsettling effect upon doctrine and the encouragement thereby afforded
the iconoclasts,"2 is inexpedient.
123. Cf. Merrfll, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. op P,%. L. REv. 879, 831,
892.
124. Cf. Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934)
47 H_ Rv. L. RE%. 628.
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Another possible course would be to regard Lawrence v. State Tax
Commission2 5 as an outmoded survivor of a dogma no longer tenable,
to be overruled as soon as possible and to accept the "one thing, one
tax" principle as one of the infinite transmogrifications of due process
of law . 26  The argument for it is of course that outlined in Farmers
Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota,12 7 namely, that the country has
become economically a unit, that property and business interests should
be protected against discriminatory and excessive taxation, that bad
feeling is engendered between states by competing policies of taxation,
that multi-state taxation is unjust. But there are many considerations
that render the "one thing, one tax" principle of dubious expedience.
Its thorough application would seriously affect the taxing systems of
almost every state. It would involve the Supreme Court in the extreme-
ly delicate task of determining which states should be accorded power to
levy various types of tax. 28 An improper choice may have serious
repercussions upon problems of enforcement.'n So far from working
injustice, multi-state taxation in most instances results in securing that
due contribution to the support of public activities in various parts of
the country which should be borne by those whose economic affairs are
conducted on the national scale.' 30 Should the rule of taxation by but
one jurisdiction become a part of our constitutional law, we shall be
faced with the necessity of providing for that contribution in some other
fashion. This will be so, whether the Court's choice be in favor of the
so-called creditor states or of the so-called debtor states. The former
have every reason to insist that their citizens and business organiza-
tions, enabled by their institutions and their laws to establish prosper-
ous commercial and financial enterprises, and enjoying their govern-
mental services, should pay a share to the support of the common-
125. 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
126. This view is urged in HaRDiG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 214-229.
127. 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
128. Some notion of the magnitude of this task may be gained from the literature that
has accrued on the subject. An entire book, with a most penetrating and scholarly analy-
sis, has been devoted to working out a principle of "integration" by which to solve the
problem of apportioning taxing power among the states on this basis. HARMno, op. Cit.
supra note 2. In addition see the articles cited supra note 2. Particularly interesting on
this point are: Lowndes, State Jurisdiction to Tax Income (1932) 6 TEMPLE L. Q. 486;
Peppin, Power of the States to Tax Intangibles or their Transfer (1930) 18 CA=at. L. Ray.
638; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 HARv. L, Rmy.
1075; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. 34 305.
129. See S rsoNr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 84-86.
130. "Apart from the question of jurisdiction, that one must pay a tax in two places,
reaching the same economic interest, with respect to which he has sought and secured the
benefit of the laws of both, does not seem to me so oppressive or arbitrary as to infringe




weal."  The debtor states have an equally valid claim. Our commer-
cial and industrial centers have been built up on the basis of national
free trade. Confine New York, or Chicago, or Philadelphia, or Detroit
to the bounds of their own states, surround them with the tariff walls
that criss-cross Europe, and their prosperity will be materially curtailed.
The privilege of national trade carries with it the obligation to assist
in supporting the government of the hinterland which sustains that
trade. 2 The outcry against Federal aid legislation on the ground that
it forces the "rich" states to give of their wealth to the "poor" is con-
summate impudence. Whence did the rich states draw their wealth?
The necessary alternative to multi-state taxation of intangible economic
interests would seem to be some device for a Federal tax levy to be ap-
portioned to the local governments in accordance with an equitably
arranged formula, probably the resultant of the opposing forces of the
several states in Congress.:' Such a program is fraught with danger to
"state's rights," would be highly difficult to adjust, and might necessitate
a constitutional amendment. 34 So long as we feel that a federal rather
than a unitary governmental structure best fits our needs, it seems inex-
pedient to centralize authority over revenue too closely-and this regard-
less of whether the centralization occurs as the result of legislation or
of adjudication.
The preferable course is to regard the inheritance tax cases simply
as superimposing upon the orthodox rule of benefit as the test of juris-
diction to tax a limitation based solely on the peculiar hardships which
the application of that theory creates in the particular field. This would
be consistent with the Court's attitude in respect to area formulas in
special assessment taxation.3 5 It would explain the limitation of the
new doctrine, as yet, to inheritance taxation, where the old rule did pro-
duce bizarre consequences, and the specific refusal to extend it to income
taxation. It would prevent the wholesale abandonment of numerous
precedents of long standing. It would maintain the freedom of the
states to plan their own revenue systems without sacrificing the obliga-
tion of far-ranging enterprise to support government in all areas whence
it draws sustenance.
If this should be -the course which the Supreme Court follows, we
may expect little, if any, extension of the doctrine of the inheritance
131. See Kessler, Some Legal Problems in State Personal Income Taxation (1925) 34
YArE L. J. 863, 878; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YA=
L. J. 305, 326.
132. Cf. STnisoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 48.
133. See HARnDG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 273; Note (1932) 10 N. C. L. Ray. 1S9.
134. Ibid.
135. Compare Gast Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55 (1916),
and Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 249 U. S. 63 (1919).
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tax cases. Other types of revenue measures are not so subject to the
evils which brought those decisions into being. Except as to income tax,
progressive rates are not in vogue, and the high rates employed in inherit-
ance taxation are not common in income levies. Moreover, save as to
constantly shifting tangible personalty, the existing decisions under the
benefit theory have permitted levies by no more than two states, whether
the tax be one on property or on income or on the person.180 As to
shifting tangible personalty, Johnson Oil Refining Company v. Okla-
homa13 7 seems an adequate safeguard against abuse. Hence the exces-
sive exactions, the possibility of which doubtless called for the inherit-
ance tax decisions, are not to be feared in these other fields.1 8 It there-
fore seems proper to hazard the prophecy that the benefit, theory of
jurisdiction to tax is not likely to be abandoned generally, despite the
sweeping language in which the "one thing, one tax" principle was enun-
ciated by the judges who spoke for the Supreme Court in the transfer
tax cases. For the present, at least, the elder cases still state the law.""
136. Of course there is a possibility, under the interpretation I have given to Hanvilk
v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 263 U. S. 510 (1924), that a man might find himself in such a
relation to more than two states as to be subject to personal or poll taxes to each of
them. There is a similar possibility in respect to corporate debts, under a combination of
mobilia sequuntur personam, corporate domicil, and business situs theories. Such cases
must necessarily be of extremely infrequent occurrence and need not disturb us.
137. 290 U. S. 158 (1933).
138. It has been suggested the evils calling forth the inheritance tax decisions "would
exist in aggravated form with respect to multi-state property taxation of intangibles."
Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 305, 320. This is
based upon the premise that protection of intangible wealth against discrimination and
unjust and oppressive taxation is just as important in respect to property taxation as in
transfer taxes. This view does not seem to take into consideration the factors I have
mentioned which obviate the possibility of oppressive taxation in the case of property
taxes. The author cited also suggests that interference with the development of a capital
market on a national scale and the bad feeling engendered by state competition in creating
tax systems favorable to intangible wealth might be evils aimed at by the new doctrine.
But the history of the country indicates no serious handicap to the nation-wide employ-
ment of capital under the old rules, and the new theory does not at all discourage the dis-
graceful habit of seeking to woo capitalists by favorable state laws. If anything, It en-
courages the practice.
139. Since the manuscript of this article was completed there has appeared an excellent
discussion: Brown, Multiple Taxation. by the States-What is Left of it? (1935) 48 HaRv.
L. REv. 407, in which the recent decisions are regarded as limiting state taxing powers much
more narrowly than I have suggested. Nevertheless I adhere to the opinions which I have
set out above. In the end, probably we both will be convicted of error by the Supreme
Court.
